This article presents the sources, nature and areas of criticism of governance. We will critically reflect on both its theoretical-normative and its pragmatic dimension. The conclusions we will arrive at will serve to highlight the main issues around which the study of the deficits of governance is focused. Finally, we will see four hypothetical scenarios for the evolution of the public governance paradigm emerge on the basis of the critical reflection and the resulting conclusions.
Th e sources and nature of criticism of governance
In the theory of public management, governance has multiple meanings and interpretations. Among them, two approaches must be mentioned: 1. public governance as the third ideal model of coordinating collective action, along with hierarchy and the market; 2. public governance as a hybrid coordination model that integrates hierarchical, market and network coordination mechanisms. Public governance as an ideal model is an idealized structure which does not occur in practice. The understanding of public governance as a hybrid model of coordinating collective action explains the practice and consequences of using governance attributes in the implementation of public policies.
In the first, idealized sense, governance is equated with self-organization, interorganizational networks or public policy networks. Such a homogenous type of coordinating collective action, based on networks and distinct from hierarchy and the market, was described by Hans Thorelli, one of the pioneers of governance (Thorelli 1986) .
In the second sense, network-based coordination mechanisms constitute only specific styles of governance, apart from which the relationships within and amongst the public, the economic and the civic sector are shaped by hierarchies, markets and communities. Accordingly, governance does not consist exclusively in cooperation, but also in competition and conflict resolution. Mechanisms of network formation and operation as well as the issues of adjusting governance styles and mechanisms to specific circumstances and context constitute important elements of governance thus conceived (Löffler 2005, p. 170) . The basic hybrid forms of governance include: (1) oligopolies -a market-based model with clearly outlined network elements and forms of coordination not limited to business entities, (2) public-private partnership -a combination of market and network mechanisms, (3) chain management -a form of network management based on func tional not social relationships among actors, which also includes hierarchical relationships, (4) open method of coordination -an approach to governance implemented in the European Union since 1997 that involves the stimulation of a continuous mutual learning process drawing from individual experiences of EU member states in carrying out reforms (Eberlein, Kerwen 2004, p. 123) , (5) certain concepts of self-regulation and self-organization, (6) other mixed types, mainly based on network and market mechanisms (Meuleman 2008, p. 15) .
Both types of governance give rise to considerable controversy. The ideal type, although normative and abstracted from social reality, may criticized from a theoretical point of view and for the formulation of generalized conclusions. In contrast, the hybrid approach, due to its practical applications, can be subject to critical reflection on the pragmatic dimension of public governance. It must also be emphasized that the theoretical and empirical aspects of public governance are difficult to separate because of the complex causal relationships existing in the order of governance, in which causes have both a theoretical-normative and pragmatic character, and a mixed networkmarket-hierarchical substance.
Criticism of governance conducted at the theoretical-normative level focuses on axiological and epistemological issues. Fundamental questions asked of the proponents of this paradigm include: Does it constitute an appropriate and worthwhile response to social change? Is the concept sufficiently well-defined and mature? Does it correspond to social expectations? What would be the social consequences of its implementation? What should be the role of the state in this paradigm? What are its cognitive limitations? What threats to democracy and social justice are likely to result from the implementation of governance?
Criticism of the pragmatic aspects of governance refers to issues such as the methodology of the implementation of governance, difficulties related to organization, competition, the economy, communication as well as the technological and cultural aspects of network management, mistakes and failures in the implementation of governance and the associated dilemmas. Critical assessments and conclusions formulated at the pragmatic level are based on empirical observations derived from specific applications of governance methods and instruments.
Criticism of governance presented in the li terature rarely takes the form of categorical judgments and tends to remain -just like its object -restrained and non-confrontational. This can be gleaned from the expressions used to describe controversies generated by governance:, which are "dilemmas", "failure", "paradoxes" or "dysfunctions".
Th eoretical-normative criticism of governance
Critical reflections on governance should begin with the question of the originality and axiological values of this paradigm. Governance, like a number of other terms in social sciences, it is not a new concept. The English term governance derives from the Latin gubernantia and was already used in the Middle Ages to mean "a method or a system of government" (Izdebski 2006, p. 25) . In fourteenthcentury France "governance" meant "the seat of government" (Pierre, Peters 2000, p. 1) , while the etymologically related Greek word kubernáo (κυβερνάω) meant "steering." Accordingly, the concept of governance did not emerge in the process of the evolution of public management theory: it existed before and was simply dusted off, refreshed, and put to work in modern analyses of collective action coordination mechanisms. Current interpretations of governance are semantically related to network systems, and in this sense are not equivalent to the original meanings of the term. However, it is hard to dispute that the rules governing the operation of networks in their modern sense, were not, even to a limited extent, part of the governance mechanisms used in the past.
2 Governance is indeed an old term but one which has been redefined, reinterpreted and qualified with the adjective "public" to describe contemporary processes of state modernization.
Various theorists challenge the status of governance due to its limited cognitive and scientific utility, which results from imprecise definitions of this concept. For B.G. Peters, governance is a tautology, since it comes down only to the statement that "whatever happens, governance exists" (Peters, 2000, p. 35) . H. George Frederickson is even more critical towards the concept. He argues that it is "freighted with values" (Frederickson, 2007, p. 289) . Bob Jessop believes that the term has become exceptionally blurred and can be applied to almost anything, and for that reason it does not describe anything, let alone explain anything (Jessop, 2003, p. 4) . Even so, Jessop does not deny the advisability of developing the governance paradigm. He suggests that its further conceptualization should be preceded by identification of a wide range of issues applicable to the coordination of collective action; next, relevant public governance issues should be placed among them; and only then the essence of public governance should be carefully and accurately defined (Jessop, 2003, p. 4) .
In Claus Offe's view, the term governance is used to describe both institutions or regulating structures and the processes that occur within these institutions (Offe 2012, p. 90) . He notes that governance oscillates between the two meanings, but is inclined to understand the concept of governance in a way suggested by Thomas Risse, namely that it is "more focused on structure than on actors" (Risse 2008) . In consequence, it is impossible to express the governance process using verbs: something is going on, but no one can be identified as the agent responsible, hence no one can be held responsible for it. Governance is therefore something that can be observed and experienced, but cannot actually be done by anyone (Offe 2012, pp. 90-91) . Offe also notes the apparent lack in the literature of a consistent answer to the question whether the concept of governance is superior to government, or is its antonym instead. The distinction between governance and management is not clear either, as evidenced by the widespread use of the term governance to describe "managing relationships" (Offe 2012, pp. 91-92) . Therefore the understanding of governance as a mechanism for coordinating collective action has become a stopgap in research. Wherever the role of the state or market mechanisms are insufficient, one may resort to governance as a non-peremptory and non-conflictual method for replacing both of those mechanisms (Offe 2012, p. 95) .
Governance is also a source of uncertainty concerning the direction of the evolution of the state, its role in this model and the nature of relationships with society. A manifestation of these underlying axiological concerns is, according to Helmut Willke, the "tragedy of the state" conceived as its entanglement in two extreme expectations. On the one hand, the state is expected to perform a sovereign role in society, since its positioning at the top of the social hierarchy offers tangible opportunities for efficient management and ad mi nistration of society. On the other hand, governance forces the state to abandon imperative decision-making so that it does not interfere with the self-organization and autonomy of society. In this way, the state becomes a victim of its own success, since by expressing specific characteristics of a classical, tragic demigod, it undermines the very factors that have shaped its evolutionary growth (Willke 2007, p. 128 ). In conclusion of his considerations, Willke appears to accept the claim that modern societies have become polycentric societies, i.e. ones in which it is impossible to recognize the primacy of one centre over others. Polycentric societies have left the stage of external control and arrived at self-steering. The state has thus lost its power to manage and control, with hierarchical structures being replaced by heterarchy (Willke 2007, pp. 137-138) . Willke offers no answers to the question concerning the actual role of the state with respect to a polycentric society, but he assumes that the state will adapt to a changing society, and not the other way round.
The role of the state is also discussed in the con text of the ideal type of governance. In his vision of the state, Rod Rhodes proposes "governing without government" (Rhodes 1996) , which essentially means governing without the involvement of the state. The expression used by Rhodes was literally interpreted by some scholars and prompted both criticism and enthusiasm. Vasudha Chhotray and Gerry Stoker argue that Rhodes' intentions were misinterpreted as the expression "governing without government" was merely a rhetorical figure used to emphasize the changing conditions of government, not a literal description of an existing state of affairs (Chhotray, Stoker 2009, pp. 46, 48) . This discussion was judiciously summarized by Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, for whom the dispute between the proponents of the concept of an active, steering state and those aligned with the concept of a minimal state is not, in fact, a fundamental dispute, but only "examining two different sides of the same coin" (Pierre, Peters 2005) .
Governance raises a number of controversies in the context of democratic theory and social justice theory. Evaluations of governance conducted through the prism of democratic theory are inconclusive as they crucially depend on a scholar's position regarding the relationship between representative democracy and public governance combined with participatory democracy 3 . The main tide of criticism comes from those who would like to see a balance between representative democracy and participatory democracy. Manuel Castells (1997) and other advocates of participatory democracy as supreme to representative democracy are more restrained in thinking that governance may be responsible for the deficit of democratic values.
There are at least several reasons behind the lowering of the status of representative democracy as a result of the development of the governance paradigm. The development of participatory mechanisms leads to the transfer of decisionmaking powers beyond representative bodies and, in consequence, to the reduction of their profile and responsibilities. Policy-makers operating within the governance paradigm are motivated to negotiate directly with social actors, which happens at the expense of purely political activities which they are supposed to pursue. Finally, the development of participatory democracy results in the inclusion in the decision-making processes of non-representative, poorly organized communities and interest groups, which has a negative impact on the overall level of accountability (Castells 1997) .
Governance is characterized by intensive use of public participation mechanisms for the coordination of collective action. Theory sees public participation as an essential attribute of governance or as the backbone of participatory governance, a special version of the governance paradigm. Each of these perspectives aims to involve citizens in public management processes and to expand the range of public mandates executed with stakeholder participation. As a result of the dissemination of participatory mechanisms in the programming and execution of public mandates, tensions arise between state administration and non-public stakeholders of public policies. They can be mitigated by implementing methods, techniques and management tools appropriate for governance.
In democratic theory discourse, there also appear legitimate questions concerning the con sequences of involving non-state actors in the implementation of public policies and the provision of public services (e.g. in the form of co-production). Do they contribute to the strengthening of democratic governance or rather the empowerment and consolidation of private governance? (Bevir 2011, p. 12) . This dilemma implies further questions and concerns. Is making government less public going to serve social justice, and if so, in what way? Is the weakening role of the state as an arbiter likely to lead to increased economic stratification of society? And finally, the fundamental issue: who and in what way will be responsible for the consequences of public policies developed and implemented in the context of an institutionalized blurring of responsibility typical of ideal governance? Apart from the domain of social justice, the blurring also occurs in such important areas as ethics, legitimacy and social inclusion (Bevir 2011, p. 12). Rhodes in part answers these questions claiming that the state acting within the governance paradigm should steer the networks, although it may do so indirectly and imperfectly at best (Rhodes 1996) .
The limited epistemological utility of governance is further corroborated by the tendency to "overaggregate" the phenomena that characterize the concept. The reason for this is that the concept has not been introduced by any authoritative social theory but by the World Bank, which made governance an important field of its activity (Offe 2012, pp. 90-94) .
Criticism of pragmatic governance
Public governance reforms are characterized by autarchy. A common problem with them is their autonomous implementation in blatant disregard of external factors and conditions, which leads to the failure of the entire process. This happens when the transformation of the government paradigm towards governance is not accompanied by the necessary changes outside the domain of public management. The consequences include normative and practical problems. The former occur when changes in public policy processes are contrary to the prevailing norms and beliefs. Practical problems arise from the mismatch between what belongs to the sphere of government and the sphere of governance, respectively, and involves territorial deployment, the distribution of functions, resources, decisionmaking and policy implementation (Krahmann 2008, p. 210) .
Critics of governance point to the opacity of relationships among policy actors and accountability deficits. This problem is particularly emphasized in the performance evaluations of the complex, multilevel governance model applied in the European Union. The relationships amongst the actors of European public policies are unclear not only for the general public but also for legitimized public authorities (Papadopoulos, 2005, p. 10) . Empirical observations reveal that various informal networks play ambiguous roles in European governance. Such networks are present especially in the envi ronment, telecommunications and energy sectors. The multitude of informal networks, however, does not go hand in hand with the quality of the outcomes of the policies pursued in the most networked sectors. The reasons for the low efficiency of European public policy networks are also weak ties among these networks and state regulators (Schout, Jordan 2006, pp. 961-962) . The lack of transparency of the actors involved in European public policy-making is made worse by a certain celebrated informality present in multi-level governance, which leads to inequality and undermines the fundamental principles of democratic governance (Peters, Pierre 2004) .
Problems arising from the lack of network transparency and unclear responsibility arrangements among the participants in public policy networks have been observed in numerous policy segments. Elke Krahmann analyses the phenomenon of increasing importance of nonpublic actors and the implementation of global governance in security policy. She shows that, apart from the loss of public control, decreased policy effectiveness and coordination failure, it results in reduced transparency and accountability. Global governance in the security sector eliminates the sovereignty of nation states and upsets the established division of responsibility. Although on the strength of intergovernmental agreements, political responsibility for security rests directly with the legislative and executive bodies, governance disperses this responsibility among numerous public and private entities. Since these entities work together in the formulation and implementation of a security policy, it is impossible to identify a specific actor who is liable for the consequences of this process. The problem is further compounded by the fact that individual security policy actors are accountable to different principals. Governments are accountable to voters, international organizations to their members, non-governmental organizations to their donors and recipients of aid, whereas armaments corporations and private arms manufacturers to their shareholders and customers. It follows that not all categories of security policy stakeholders are accountable to the public or remain under democratic parliamentary control (Krahmann 2008, p. 210) .
Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers prove that the fundamental challenge faced by public authorities implementing network management mechanisms is to convince private actors of the paramount importance of public values in all projects undertaken within the network (Goldsmith, Eggers 2004, p. 57). While public policy constitutes a material integrator for network participants, public policy objectives do not always figure prominently in the hierarchies of interests of individual network members. In extreme cases, the problem may take the form of a crisis of public values, and a policy generated in the shadow of such a crisis may be the more "public", the stronger position in the network is occupied by custodians of public values.
The basic theoretical premise of network management is networks' claimed natural capacity for self-organization. However, there is no shortage of arguments to the contrary, stating that networks are incapable of self-organization. Goldsmith and Eggers say that network that efficiently provide public services do not emerge automatically. Someone must first competently design them in order to produce a coherent system of service delivery, integrating public and nonpublic participants (Goldsmith, Eggers 2004, p. 58) . Empirical studies show that networks cannot operate without state support. They require interventions of public institutions, usually via some kind of leadership or influence on network activities (Bell, Park 2006; Marinetto 2003) . These conclusions challenge, on pragmatic grounds, the correctness of axiological assumptions about the natural emergence and sustainability of networks as the basic attribute of governance.
The quality of networks that provide public services is determined by their designers. It is up to them to identify stakeholders, to invite them to cooperate, to analyze the existing measures, to formulate the principles of communication and expectations of the network and notify all partners accordingly, to initiate network formation, to determine the necessary management principles and, finally, to launch the network. The challenge for network designers is to ensure their plasticity (in order to accommodate each partner), dynamism (capacity to adapt to changing environmental conditions), and, at the same time, sufficient stability (in order to consistently strive to achieve its goals) (Goldsmith, Eggers 2004, p. 55) . A key task of the designers is to conceive and calibrate the mechanisms of network operation in order to ensure the delivery of expected results and, in consequence, to achieve the set objectives. (Goldsmith, Eggers 2004, p. 57) . These considerations suggest that the key source of any disruptions and dysfunctions in network operation is its initial design. Moreover, errors made at the design stage are usually difficult to eliminate by way of day-to-day network management, even if the management is fully competent.
Achieving satisfactory outcomes in public management requires overcoming numerous difficulties related to decision-making. In hybrid organizations established within the framework of the governance paradigm, which bring together numerous stakeholders and remain in pluralistic relationships typical for networks, relatively few decisions are made in a hierarchical and cascade manner, that is, typical of the traditional bureaucracy. Governance thus forces politicians and officials to look for ways to act which are different from those fixed in the bureaucratic order (Bevir 2011, p. 11) . Nevertheless, coordinating positions in network systems is a complicated and lengthy process, which is mainly due to the consensus-based manner of reaching final decisions.
Network membership and management require fairly high and wide-ranging competencies from all actors involved in a given network. The emphasis on improving competencies motivates structural changes in the education and on-the-job training of public officials. If such development lags behind the pace of implementation of network management, it will inevitably lead to dysfunctions in the public administration system. High qualifications are also required from nonpublic network participants, whose improvement cannot be effected by imperative methods. The development of these competencies should be promoted only in a way that does not produce a dissonance between governance methods based on partnership and the recognition of equal status one one hand and coercion typical of the hierarchical state on the other.
Investment in human capital requires financial expenditure, which is usually compensated for by measurable improvements in the outcomes of implemented public policies. Nevertheless network management requires high costs in other areas (Radaelli 2007) where outcomes are not easily measurable, and therefore not clearly advantageous from an economic point of view. The expenditure primarily goes to communication, coordination, consultation and public partici pation. Researchers analyzing governance mechanisms in the European Union emphasized that the achievement of a high coordination capacity requires, apart from investment in human capital, substantial spending on ensuring an efficient exchange of information between the European administration and other entities involved in EU policies, as well as appropriate decisionmaking and problem-solving procedures. Network management is particularly costly in the case of multi-level governance operating in the European Union. The principal reason for this is the lack of streamlined adaptation and implementation in the form of specific projects, ideas and solutions generated by the activities of transnational networks in individual nation states (Schout, Jordan 2006, pp. 961-962) .
Governance also causes communication problems in networks that are notoriously difficult to eliminate (Goldsmith, Eggers 2004, p. 40) . Governance assumes equal rights of entities that constitute integrated network systems. It is difficult to implement management methods that would guarantee the same level of information among all the network participants. In information economics, which derives from neoclassical economics, a similar problem affects market transactions between buyers and sellers, and is called information asymmetry 4 . Network management causes technological problems following from the incompatibility of information systems used by network participants (Goldsmith, Eggers 2004, p. 40) . It can be safely assumed that the more numerous and diverse a network is, the more serious the incompatibility of its information systems. However, technological barriers are usually overcome much faster than social or cultural ones. The pace of the process cannot be accurately predicted, but the direction is is going is clear. Negative aspects of the incompatibility of information systems are well known in the technological industry and to com puter users. They are demonstrated by the evolution of information systems and software into open solutions, compatible with products offered by the competition, and the development of the free-software movements such as open source or creative commons.
As already mentioned, cultural barriers among network members are more difficult to overcome. Networks are constituted by clusters of partners from different backgrounds. So far, governance has not developed effective management mechanisms to eliminate the counterproductive effects of differences of opinions rooted in the cultural characteristics of the participants representing the public interest, private property and the non-governmental sector (Goldsmith, Eggers 2004, p. 40) .
Governance is time-consuming and for that reason it does not fit the realities of managing multiple public policies. The implementation of governance requires that a number of principles specific to this paradigm are observed. It is difficult to reconcile the expectations regarding the pace of decision-making which arise from the dynamics of political life with the postulate of social inclusion, representativeness of the partners involved in the design and implementation of public policies, the quality of the public consultation process or responsiveness, characteristic of governance (Hallsworth, Parker, Rutter 2011, p. 8) . The timeframe and numerous organizational difficulties associated with the implementation of governance processes result in the fragmentation of management processes, which makes this paradigm susceptible to a number of anomalies, whose elimination requires significant outlays.
Public governance is characterized by poor public evaluation mechanisms. Their origin of this lies in the specificity of public policies designed in the spirit of governance, which are complex and difficult to implement. The complexity of these policies entails enormous methodological difficulties associated with their evaluation, even by such basic criteria as effectiveness and efficiency. The main problem affecting evaluation is the lack of precision in defining policy objectives, which makes it difficult or even impossible to assess their impact (Radaelli 2007) .
Criticism is also directed at governance tools. One such tool is the open method of coordination, a unique governance instrument employed in European Union policy-making. The central problem with this voluntaristic approach is the lack of sanctions, which are extremely important if the policy objectives established using the open method of coordination are outlined in very general terms; non-representativeness of best practices disseminated using this method (Eberlein, Kerwen 2004, p. 124) ; difficulties in measuring and comparing the impact of best practices among the EU member states; and hence the impossibility to legitimize the policy effects (Citi, Rhodes, 2007, pp. 10-11) .
Conclusions
The governance paradigm has not yet been fully developed, which makes it an easy target of criticism. The discussion on the deficits of governance identified at the theoretical-normative level focuses on two conceptual extremes. The first involves the polemic with Rhodes' "governance without government" understood as both a challenge to the axiological assumptions of such an idea and an instance of undermining its pragmatic feasibility. At the other end of the spectrum, there is the opposition to any attempts to determine the future shape of the state due to the fact that the changing environment will force it to adapt to new contexts. Willke's discussion with his concept of polycentric society belongs in the second trend. Both kinds of theoreticalnormative criticism differ with respect to whether it is primarily the society that is supposed to adapt to the changing state or the state that must adapt to social change.
Criticism of governance from the pragmatic point of view focuses on the rift between the theoretical foundations of the paradigm and its practical applications. The basic question formulated here concerns the actual capacity of governance to achieve better public policy outcomes than those achieved through hierarchical or market mechanisms of coordinating collective action. Pragmatic criticism also focuses on the identification of specific problems faced by public authorities attempting to reform their hierarchical and market-based contracting management practices in favour of network management. Con clusions arrived at by pragmatic critics of governance, similarly as those who chose the theoreticalnormative approach, do not usually come down to a complete disavowal of governance, but only focus on the magnitude of difficulties which must be overcome in order to make governance a more useful paradigm in practice. Building effective governance mechanisms require the overcoming of obstacles associated with: network design and organization, coordination and communication of network activities, high network operating costs, insufficient competencies of partners, cultural and technological differences, capacity of network participants to cooperate, negotiate and reach agreements, focus on shared network objectives, network operations being time-consuming and the evaluation of the outcomes being difficult.
he views and arguments presented above concerning the weakness of governance mecha nisms may not be exhaustive, but are a fair summary of current scientific debate on the subject. It is difficult to predict further development of the governance paradigm, although its continued presence in the mainstream of public management research is indisputable. By way of summarizing the discussion presented in this chapter, I would like to present four hypothetical scenarios for the evolution of the public governance paradigm.
They are not mutually exclusive, which means that the potential development of the model may follow any and all of them.
he first scenario assumes that governance develops towards a kind of ideal governance, which entails a gradual elimination from the practice of public management of hierarchies and markets as methods of coordinating collective action.
nder the second scenario, fairly unambiguous boundaries between the spheres of imperative authority, market-based contracting and civic responsibility are charted in the space of public management. This leads to the formation of an order characterized by a symbiotic coexistence of hierarchical, market and governance paradigms. In this constellation, each paradigm has comparatively exclusive, customized roles and areas of competence. The emergence of symbiotic governance models thus conceived cannot be the product of a mechanical policy pursued under the influence of fads or ideological hegemony. For example, numerous studies of public management mechanisms employed in the European Union reveal that the coexistence of several paradigms constitutes one of the reasons for the numerous dysfunctions of the EU policy system (Ellinas, Suleiman 2008 , Schout, Jordan 2006 , Marks 1993 , Zawicki 2010 .
he third scenario assumes that governance falls victim to the convergence of its individual paradigms and turns into a hierarchy-marketnetwork paradigm. Research in this area has already been initiated by Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, who, on the basis of public management practices in twelve mature democracies, identified three dominant models. Apart from new public management and governance, there is the neo-Weberian state, a modernized version of the traditional Weberian bureaucracy supplemented with the attributes of public governance (Pollitt, Bouckaert, 2011) .
he fourth scenario envisages the subjectivization and redefinition of the values of public management para digms. The evolution of the traditional bureau cracy towards new public management was characterized by the implementation of appro priately objective management methods. The post-positivist method, whose inherent feature is the subjectivity of its assumptions, methods, tools, criteria, etc., is more appropriate for public governance, which faces the difficult challenge of developing effective mechanisms to coordinate collective action, taking into account the complexity of social life. Subjectivization does not belittle knowledge acquired using po sitivist methods, but definitely favours intuition, experience and non-verbalized tacit knowledge as understood by Michael Polanyi. One of the consequences of subjectivization is the acceptance of the relativity of assessments of governance mechanisms. Beyond that, there is a redefinition of values of public management paradigms, which means that their erstwhile advantages become something akin to shortcomings or even faults. Conversely, new values or old weaknesses become positive traits. These transformations have already started. In the debate on governance, substantive values are supplemented with or confronted with procedural values. In evaluation studies, besides efficiency, effectiveness and utility, special focus is accorded to equality, justice and other procedural and quality criteria. Evaluation of public policy outcomes is supplemented or confronted with participatory evaluation. Individual responsibility is supplemented or replaced with collective responsibility.
he subjectivization and redefinition of values is likely to achieve conceptual coherence as long as they accompany the transformation of governance towards the ideal type (the first scenario) or governance that constitutes a distinct part of the tri-paradigmatic symbiotic order (the second scenario). The evolution of governance towards the amalgamated paradigm (the third scenario) requires the combination of hierarchy, market and network values in a homogenous configuration, coupled with the unification of research methods.
